Resurrection from Babel: The cultural, political, and legal status of Christian
communities in Lebanon and Syria and their prospects for the future.
Alexandra R. Harrington
Part I – Introduction.
In the well-known Biblical story, the faithful, attempting to create a place of
unity for themselves, set about building the Tower of Babel, only to see the Tower
implode due to linguistic differences and power assertions.1 The end result of efforts
based in faith and mutual belief was utter destruction of the shared dream and goal, and
all of those involved in the Tower’s attempted building were relegated to the same failure
despite their best intentions and communal support.2
Thousands of years later, the world is still plagued by sectarian strife and warfare.
Indeed, the situation has only become more involved since Babel, as there are now intercommunal and intra-communal conflicts for supremacy and superiority – a notable
difference in these conflicts is that the ultimate tool of getting to Heaven is no longer a
tower, it is now a state. Within the framework of the much-vaunted and highly-contested
state structure which sits at the heart of inter-communal and intra-communal conflicts lies
a duality of politics and law. A state cannot exist without political actors, whatever their
motivations may be, and political actors of all belief systems have embraced the need for
laws as a method of control – if not equality and a means of assuring an open society.
For Christian communities in the Middle East there is perhaps no greater a living
symbol of the effects of Babel-esque intra-communal fighting than Lebanon. The fighting

M.A. candidate 2006, Politics (International Relations concentration) New York University; J.D. 2005,
Albany Law School of Union University; B.A. Politics, B.A. History 2002, New York University.
1
Genesis: 11.
2
Id.

1

between Christian communities in Lebanon,3 and the alliances of these communities with
various Muslim communities and other nations to try to crush rival Christian opposition,4
is more than just a memory of decades past; it continues today, albeit in slightly less
violent forms than during the civil war which ravaged the country for over a decade.5 By
contrast, the political and legal standing of Christian communities across the border in
Syria is nowhere near as visible, or publicized, as their Lebanese co-religionists.6
However, lack of visibility does not correlate to lack of existence, and indeed there are
many historical Christian communities within Syria.7 Disturbingly, at a time when many
see the Middle East as an area that is unquestionably Muslim in character, and when Arab
scholars themselves write on the topic of creating a symbiosis between democracy and
Islam8 while ignoring the existence of other salient groups in the democratic debate mix,9
Christian communities in Lebanon and Syria appear to be phased out of public discourse.
Yet there is perhaps no more vital a time for these communities to come to the forefront
of the political and legal lives of their nations than at the present, as the future
composition of the Middle East lies in the balance, and with it the future rights of these
communities.
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Part II of this article will discuss the Lebanese situation.10 This part starts with a
description of the Christian communities in Lebanon, including their relationships with
larger churches throughout the world.11 Discussion then turns to the political history of
Lebanon since the nation’s founding - with the promulgation of its constitution - in
1926,12 which necessarily includes the Christian communities.13 Emphasis will be placed
on the intra-communal relationships during the last civil war (1975 - 1991)14 and its
aftermath,15 as well as the growth of Islamist groups in Lebanon and their effect on the
global perception of Lebanon as a political actor.16 After this historical discussion, the
article will present the Lebanese constitutional law, as well as statutory law in the form of
electoral law, personal status law, property law, and criminal law.17 These laws will be
analyzed in terms of their plain language meanings and practical implications in a
country which has varied widely from the tenets of the rule of law and the guarantees
enshrined in its constitution despite having had a continual constitutional apparatus since
10
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1926.18 Part II will close with the author’s call for unity among Lebanese Christian
communities as a way to ensure political stability,19 enshrine legal rights for Christians in
Lebanon which do not mirror those applied to Christians in other Muslim communities
(or the dhimmi patterns used in the Ottoman Empire),20 and give Lebanese Christians a
greater role in the control of their country.21 It will be argued that these suggestions will
not only strengthen the Christian communities, and Lebanon itself, but will also
strengthen Lebanese Muslim communities which are currently facing an uneasy choice
between terrorist group affiliation and a peaceful civil society.22 Unity among Lebanon’s
Christian communities will also invite confidence from the United States and its allies in
the global war on terror, which would serve to bolster the ability of the Lebanese state to
be a reliable and functional ally rather than a Syrian pawn.23
Part III of this article will discuss the Syrian situation.24 The available information
on Christian communities in Syria is not on par with the information available about the
Lebanese Christian communities, hence the initial background discussion of the Syrian
Christian communities will be brief.25 Part III will turn from the Syrian Christian
communities themselves to the history of Syria since its independence in 1926, with an
emphasis on its cross-border role in Lebanon.26 A discussion of Syrian constitutional law,
as well as statutory law in the form of election law, personal status law, and the effect of
18
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decades old emergency law will then ensue.27 As in Part II, the legal analysis will
emphasize the real, pragmatic state of Syrian law rather than the esoteric or plain
meaning of the Syrian constitution.28 The conclusion of Part III will be the author’s call
for Syrian Christians – those in Syria and those who have emigrated – along with
Lebanese Christians to use the increasingly dire situation of the Assad regime in Syria to
push for legal reform for Syrian Christians and Syrians as a whole.29 This call comes with
the caveat that domestic agitation might be too risky to attempt at present,30 but will
highlight that, if Lebanese Christian communities were to follow the author’s
recommendations in Part II, the situation and bargaining power of Syrian Christians
would likely increase as a result.31
Finally, Part IV will summarize the conclusions and recommendations in Parts II
and III for Lebanon and Syria.32 Part IV will emphasize that from the pieces of Christian
communities in Lebanon and Syria which have been ravaged by both internal and
external forces, it is possible to resurrect the modern Babel and fashion, if not a tower to
Heaven, at the very least two states which celebrate their shared faiths rather than their
devastating divisions.33
Part II – Lebanon.
A. Christian Communities in Lebanon
The officially recognized Christian communities in Lebanon include the
Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Armenian Catholics, Roman Catholics,
27
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Syrian Catholics, Armenian Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Orthodox Melkites, and forms
of Protestantism.34 These communities have a long history with Lebanon,35 and were part
of the Ottoman governing system of allowing millets – groups of non-Islamic, or nonArabic as the case might be, peoples – to live within the confines of the Ottoman Empire
in exchange for a lower social status and payments from the millet leaders to the Ottoman
regime.36 As fellow believers in God and “the book,” Christian communities were also
protected by the Ottomans because of their status as dhimmi – believers who did not
convert to Islam but nevertheless worshiped God and a holy book.37
Throughout the growth and development of Mount Lebanon, Beirut, and the areas
which comprise modern-day Lebanon, the Maronites and the Greek Orthodox became the
paramount groups in the Christian power structure38; the Maronites came to control the
Mountain,39 and the Greek Orthodox extended more control over Beirut.40 Politically,
these groups have stood the test of time and continue to be the most influential Christian
communities in Lebanon,41 although in the author’s opinion all of the Christian
communities have gained in status – extant or potential – in the wake of the civil war and
34
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the current war on terrorism taking place in the Middle East. This is so because many of
the traditional leaders in the Maronite community in particular were killed or forced into
exile by the civil war,42 and recent polling data indicates that many of the remaining
Christian political leaders in general are tainted in the eyes of Lebanese Christians
because of their dependence upon and affiliation with Syria.43 In this situation, it is
politically feasible that a member of any Christian community, with the right grass-roots
support and personality, could emerge as a future leader of a block of united Lebanese
Christian communities, provided that the political and legal reality of the need for unity is
understood and achieved.44 After all, the presence of Maronites and other Christian
groups in Lebanon has historically been such that, at its founding, many Lebanese
considered the nation to be rightfully Christian.45
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To understand how this unity is possible in terms of beliefs as well as pragmatic
politics, it is important to examine briefly the doctrinal beliefs of several Christian groups
and their historical places in Lebanon.
1. The Maronites
Founded as a separate religious group, the Maronites are currently one of the
many Uniate Churches affiliated with Roman Catholicism through a sworn allegiance to
the Pope.46 Maronites have claimed shelter in Mount Lebanon for well over a thousand
years, were involved in the Crusades at various points in time,47 and were rewarded with
the 1584 founding of the Maronite College in Rome.48 The Maronite College still exists
today,49 as does the role of the Maronite clergy as religious and political leaders within
Lebanon.50
With historical longevity on its side, the Maronite Church in Lebanon has
continued to be a political force.51 Maronites were vehement that Lebanon be founded on
the principle of having a Christian majority after independence was achieved in 1943.52
However, at the time of the creation of the Lebanese constitution, which was in essence
the founding of the modern Lebanese Republic,53 and in the years afterward when
citizenship and voting rights became paramount issues in the political and legal power

46

Gemayel, supra note 34.
Gemayel, supra note 34. Interestingly, some of the Muslim civil war opponents of the Maronites in
particular referred to them as “crusaders.” See Johns, supra note 35.
48
Gemayel, supra note 34; HOURANI, supra note 20, at 242.
49
Gemayel, supra note 34.
50
WALID KHALIDI, CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN LEBANON: CONFRONTATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 68 – 72
(1979).
51
See Maktabi, supra note 45, at 227; WINSLOW, supra note 35, at 67; BACKGROUND NOTE LEBANON,
supra note 14.
52
See Maktabi, supra note 45.
53
Id.
47

8

structure of Lebanon,54 the Maronites and other Christian communities took a pragmatic
view of the need to buffer the Christian communities as a whole, consenting to the
extension of citizenship rights to members of other Christian communities who had
emigrated.55
Due to the potential contentiousness that a religion-based census could bring to
Lebanon, an official census has not been released since the 1932 census which was used
to create the legislative apportionment scheme of seats as 6 Christian seats for every 5
Muslim seats in the Lebanese Parliament.56 However, the total estimated Christian
population in Lebanon is approximately 1.48 million, representing the estimate that
Christians comprise approximately 39% of the Lebanese population as of mid-2005.57 In
this context, it is important to note the toll that the 1975-1991 civil war took on the
Christian communities in Lebanon as a whole. It has been estimated that roughly 950,000
people fled Lebanon during the decades of the war, approximately two-thirds of whom
were Christians.58 It is also estimated that roughly two-thirds of the Lebanese who fled
during the civil war and have chosen not to return to Lebanon to date are Christians of
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some denomination.59 All Christian denominations in Lebanon are or have been active in
the propagation of religious orders in Lebanon, and/or the maintenance of hospitals,
schools, and charitable institutions as well.60 Many of these institutions, especially
schools, were damaged or destroyed in the war,61 yet still carry on today as integral parts
of the community. Indeed, with the exception of the American University of Beirut,62 the
best known universities in Lebanon are at least affiliated with Christianity.63
Due to their preeminent status among the Lebanese Christian communities, the
Maronites have enjoyed the guarantee that the President of Lebanon will always be a
Maronite.64 The only other groups so privileged are the Sunnis, who are guaranteed the
Prime Minister’s spot in any Lebanese government,65 and the Shi’is, who are guaranteed
the slot of the President of the Lebanese Parliament.66
During the civil war, by far the greatest number of Christian combatant groups
were Maronites;67 indeed, although the Lebanese national Kata’ib party was founded on
the idea of a Christian state in Lebanon,68 it ultimately eschewed a Maronite identity and
became associated with the Maronite-dominated Phalanges party and its militant
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groups.69 While the civil war raged, so too did the internal divisions within the Maronite
community – particularly within the groups established by former notable Maronite
families.70 Ultimately, these divisions would provide an opening for both Syria and Israel
to enter the conflict and add their own agendas to the war and the peace which
followed.71
Despite the ravages of war, the Maronites have managed to maintain their
permanent hold on the Presidency, and have also maintained the majority apportionment
of Christian seats in the Lebanese Parliament even after the Ta’if Agreement (officially
known as the Charter of Lebanese National Reconciliation72) altered the apportionment
of seats in the Parliament so that there would be absolute parity between Christians and
Muslims.73 However, neither the Ta’if provisions nor the constitutional enshrinement of
religion-based awarding of key governmental posts has been enough to stop violence
carried out against Christian targets and in Christian neighborhoods, most recently in the
form of bombings.74
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2. The Greek Orthodox
The Greek Orthodox Church in Lebanon traces its origins to the early years of
Christianity.75 As a separate entity from Roman Catholicism, and not part of the Uniate
Churches, the Greek Orthodox population is not affiliated with the Vatican, although
recent popes and patriarchs have made overtures which indicate that all sides are willing
to attempt to breach the schism which divided the churches initially.76 While the
Maronites primarily gathered on Mount Lebanon, the Greek Orthodox became
increasingly urban, especially during the nineteenth-century, when many Greek Orthodox
became traders, merchants and bankers.77
As mentioned above, the Greek Orthodox represent the second largest Christian
community in Lebanon, and have historically held this position.78 There are no
governmental positions guaranteed to the Greek Orthodox community under the National
Pact,79 although the community has been apportioned fourteen seats in the Lebanese
Parliament since the Ta’if Agreement.80 Despite the lack of a guarantee for the holding of
certain positions, the Greek Orthodox clergy and leadership still wield tremendous
influence within the community.81
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In the civil war years, the Christian communities in Lebanon fought not only
within their own sects, but also with their co-religionists. Maronites and Greek Orthodox
fought each other,82 as well as other Christians and Muslims,83 in a war which, although it
began as a religious war in name, ultimately blurred confessionalism with pragmatic
alliances and, in the process, undermined the cohesion of the Lebanese Christian
communities. In and of itself, this was dangerous enough for Lebanese Christians,
however media coverage of the war, which tended to portray the conflict as between
Muslims and Christians, or Israelis and Arabs, created and perpetuated an understanding
of the politics of the region which is oversimplified, easily manipulated, and ongoing into
present-day media and international societal understandings.
3. Other Christian communities
With the exception of the Protestant groups represented in Lebanon, the
remaining Christian communities are either part of the Uniate church umbrella linking
them to Roman Catholicism,84 Roman Catholic themselves,85 or various forms of
Orthodox churches.86 Although these communities do not have the numerical strength of
the Maronites or Greek Orthodox,87 they nevertheless have long standing historical ties to
Lebanon, and are an integral part of Lebanese society.
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These communities were involved in, and damaged by, the civil war; indeed it can
be argued that the damage sustained by these communities was perhaps more than the
majority communities, as the plight of the majority communities, however misidentified
as the plight of “Christians” or “Arabs” in general, was more visible to the world. In an
electoral sense, these communities have regained at least some measure of status under
the current Christian Parliamentary apportionment system.88
B. Lebanese Creation and Strife
Lebanon’s status changed dramatically in the early twentieth century, starting out
as part of the rapidly declining Ottoman Empire,89 then becoming a French mandate after
the cessation of World War I,90 promulgating a constitution in 1926,91 and eventually
achieving its own independence in 1943.92 When Lebanon was created it was an enigma,
the first Christian-associated nation in the Middle East at the time. Although known for
its confessional status, the original Lebanese constitution eschewed confessionalism,
declaring that there would be religious freedom and tolerance for all.93
Like most enigmas, particularly those dependent on politics and law to perpetuate
their status, Lebanon’s myth was soon subsumed by the reality of inter-confessional
divisions which threatened the future of the young nation. In 1943, these divisions
resulted in the National Pact - an unwritten agreement between various powerful political
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leaders of religious communities - that created the 6 Christian/5 Muslim Parliamentary
seat apportionment system94 which would remain in effect until the Ta’if Agreement.95
The National Pact also enshrined the permanent assignment of the Presidency of the
Lebanese Republic to a Maronite, the position of Prime Minister to a Sunni, and the
President of the Lebanese Parliament to a Shi’ia.96
The reasons asserted for the increasing tensions in Lebanon in the years from the
creation of the National Pact through the next incidence of civil strife in 1958,97 and
culminating in the civil war are myriad: the increasing influence of Israel and Palestinian
refugees relocated to Lebanon98; the rising influence of Syria in Lebanon’s domestic
politics and in the international world99; the increasing number of Muslims in the country,
coupled with Lebanon’s status as the only Christian country in the otherwise Muslim
Middle East100; the changing social and economic milieu of the country101; the difficulties
in trying to establish a pan-Arab culture with sectarian differences102; the list goes on.
What comes out of these explanations is not only a muddied understanding of the
situation; rather, the disconnect between the laws and principles enshrined in legal
documents and discourse and the meaning of these laws and principles in reality becomes
vividly real.
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This disconnect reached new heights during the civil war,103 when law as such
was ineffective, and even customary communal laws – such as respect for notable
families,104 respect for elders and women,105 and the observance of standard social tenets
grounded in religious teachings, i.e. that killing is illegal and against God’s
commandments106 – were cast aside in an escalating cycle of violence and hatred.107 The
disconnect was thus nearly complete.
Once peace arrived through the Ta’if Agreement,108 which is widely held to be a
compromise document created at the behest of foreign governments – particularly
Syria109 – the words of law were again meant to solidify the Lebanese state, though this
time at the cost of significant legislative powers for the Christian communities as a
whole.
C. Lebanese Constitutional and Statutory Law
1. Lebanese Constitutional Law
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The original Lebanese constitution was promulgated in 1926,110 and has been
amended on multiple occasions.111 In the aftermath of the civil war, a new constitutional
preamble was inserted, providing in relevant part that: Lebanon is “sovereign, free, and
independent,” for the benefit of all of its “children,” inside the borders recognized by the
international community112; Lebanon is Arab in its identity113; the Lebanese economic
system is open and guarantees individual rights and private property114; and that “the
suppression of confessionalism in politics constitutes an essential practice for the
nation.”115 Title one, chapter two of the constitution provides that all Lebanese are to be
considered for public employment without regard to factors other than their individual
merit and qualifications, as well as other factors dictated by law.116 Chapter two also
protects private property from a governmental taking without reason and
compensation.117
Contrary to the goals of the preamble, Title two, Chapter two provides that
apportionment for parliamentary seats is to be made initially on an equal division
between Christians and Muslims,118 with these seats subdivided by region119 and by sect
within each religion and region.120 Currently, the Lebanese Parliament is comprised of
128 seats,121 of which 64 are designated as Christian seats and 64 as Muslim seats.
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Interestingly, despite the apportionment system used, the constitution goes on to state that
each Member of Parliament (“MP”) is a member for the nation rather than his own
constituency, and must act accordingly in performing the duties of his office.122
The President of Lebanon is largely a figurehead under constitutional law, albeit it
a confessionally selected figurehead. His powers as commander-in-chief are subsumed by
the powers of the Council of Ministers,123 and technically his term is limited to one
consecutive term,124 although past and present attempts to thwart this provision have been
made.125 The President signs laws into effect, although he does not possess the ability to
change laws promulgated by Parliament126; in terms of foreign policy, both the President
and the Prime Minister must sign treaties into law for them to be legally binding.127 The
Prime Minister is named by the President with the consent of Parliament.128 The primary
executive function of the Lebanese government is carried out by the Council of Ministers,
which is comprised of MPs elevated to ministerial status.129
2. Statutory Law
A. Electoral Laws
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Electoral laws are the backbone to free participation in government and an open
society. In Lebanon, all Lebanese who are age 21 or over are given the franchise, as long
as they are not subject to a legal penalty130 (i.e. deprivation of rights as punishment131 or
an established state of mental insanity132) and are not part of the military or any other
national policing body.133 Eligible voters are registered to vote in their assigned
geographical electoral districts by religious sect,134 and must identify themselves by
name, address, and religion when going to the polls to vote.135 There are established
mechanisms of governmental oversight of persons who are on voting lists and their status
as eligible voters, and these lists must be compared prior to any election.136
B. Personal Status Laws
Under the terms of the Lebanese constitution, all Lebanese are “children” of the
nation and enjoy the same rights, regardless of confession.137 However, the Lebanese
personal status laws illustrate the disconnect between constitutional imperatives and the
reality of law and society in Lebanon. Secular courts in Lebanon,138 which are tasked
with certain limited functions (many of these having to do with governmental and
constitutional oversight), figure heavily in Lebanese jurisprudence.139 It is important to
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note that religious communities form their own councils and governmental bodies for
their communities in addition to administering religious courts.140
Religious courts in Lebanon are barred from trying cases brought pursuant to
Lebanese penal laws, as well as certain civil cases.141 While it is possible for a person to
change his religious sect, religious courts will assume that they have jurisdiction over a
person if they have jurisdiction over the person’s father by virtue of his religious
affiliation.142 If the father changes his religious affiliation and his child has yet to reach
the legal age of majority, the father’s new religion has jurisdiction over both the father
and his children.143 In cases where the litigants belong to different religions, jurisdiction
shifts to secular courts.144
One of the primary areas of jurisprudence for religious courts is marriage, and
subsidiary questions arising from marriage-related issues. It is in these areas that there is
a disparity between the laws and requirements for Christians of various sects (not to
mention Jews and Muslims)145; for example, Catholic and Orthodox communities have
slightly different requirements for marital capacity,146 and their interpretation of what
voids a marriage and the effects of a void marriage on any children of that marriage differ
vastly.147 Christian communities also differ in their requirements for establishing valid
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parentage, recognition of children, and adoption of children.148 Religious status also
impacts on the inheritance and gift-giving rights of Lebanese in both life and death.149
C. Property Law
Regardless of their religion, landowning Lebanese are required to register their
land with their local government,150 subject to an official assessment of the land by a
surveyor.151 All landowners receive the same rights in and to their property,152 subject to
the general interests of society in the use of the property and the ability of the government
to take the property for cause and with compensation to the property owner.153 Disputes
regarding landownership,154 and the ability to use the right of usufruct155 are governed by
secular Lebanese courts, except to the extent that inheritance laws are involved.156
D. Criminal Law
All Lebanese are subject to the criminal code regardless of their religious
affiliation or status.157 The criminal code makes distinctions between crimes which
qualify as “major offenses”158 and those which are essentially misdemeanor offenses159;
crimes that are classified as political are subject to a different set of mens rea
requirements and punishment standards than those imposed for major offenses and
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misdemeanors.160 Criminal trials start at the lower court level,161 and their adjudicative
results can be appealed up a chain of appellate courts as applicable for outcome only and
not sentencing,162 except in the case of military court decisions, which have a separate
appellate procedure.163 There is a limited right to counsel at certain points in the
adjudicative and questioning process, subject to the rights of the examining magistrate
during the initial investigative proceeding.164
D. Possibilities for the future
As the previous sections have illustrated, there is a clear disconnect between
constitutional provisions, laws, and societal practices in Lebanon. The constitution itself
decries confessionalism in politics, yet at the same time enshrines voting procedures
which institutionalize religious voting segregation.165 Electoral laws provide the franchise
based solely on citizenship status and capacity, however voters are registered by religion
and must identify themselves by such when they vote.166 Criminal and civil laws of the
Lebanese nation are applied to all Lebanese alike, yet intimate personal legal issues are
subject to the requirements of religious courts and bodies except in rare circumstances
which cross the communal divide.167 Lebanese property law provides for equal
protections of landowners regardless of religion, unless it intersects with questions of
inheritance, which are the province of religious courts.168 These differences and
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contradictions only further serve to divide Lebanese Christian communities themselves,
not to mention Lebanese society as a whole.
There are many historical reasons for the legal divide between Christian and
Muslim communities in Lebanon, and indeed a call to radically change this practice is not
only unrealistic, but also potentially dangerous given the presence of Hizbollah169 and
other terrorist groups which have used Lebanese internal weaknesses to create instability
in the region in the past and continue their attempts to do so.170 However, this is not
necessarily a bad thing for the current and future state of Lebanon, and its Christian and
Muslim populations.
At present, there is a divide between nations fighting the war on terror and Middle
Eastern countries, whose response to the war varies from the more aggressive pursuit of
terrorists,171 to countries which are much more likely to pay lip service to the idea of
stopping terrorists than to take concrete action to stop them.172 This is certainly a political
and cultural divide, which in many cases is mirrored in the structure of legal, or at least
tacit, legitimization of terror groups in the electoral process.173 In the morass of intranational and inter-Arab debate over terrorism and Islamist concepts, there are very few
169

For a brief explanation of the origins of Hizbollah, see generally BACKGROUND NOTE LEBANON, supra
note 14.
170
See LEBANON FACTBOOK, supra note 14. In fact, Hizbollah has become such an entrenched presence in
the Lebanese political sphere that, for the first time, an open member of Hizbollah was elected to the
Parliament and is serving as a minister. See “Lebanon Reborn? Defining National Priorities and Prospects
for Democratic Renewal in the Wake of March 14, 2005,” Panel I of a Hearing of the House International
Relations Committee, Federal News Service (Jul. 28, 2005) (statement of Rep. Tom Lantos). This
ministerial appointment has drawn sharp criticism, especially from the United States, which is unable to
meet with any members of Hizbollah, in accordance with its policies regarding giving even tacit
recognition to terrorist groups. See id.(statement of C. David Welch, Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs).
171
Egypt, for example, has been fighting the Muslim Brotherhood for years. See generally CARRIE
ROSEFSKY WICKHAM, MOBILIZING ISLAM: RELIGION, ACTIVISM, AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN EGYPT
(2002).
172
See infra Part III (discussing Syria).
173
Again, Egypt is a primary example of this despite its long-time ban on political participation by the
Muslim Brotherhood. See generally WICKHAM, supra note 171.

23

state-based ways to offer interested Muslims a way out of conflict without engendering
suspicion from outside forces and their co-religionists. However, the situation of the
Lebanese Christian communities presents such an opportunity for Muslims, as well as for
the Christian communities themselves.
The legal framework for religious tolerance in Lebanon already exists. At the
same time, there exists a legislative power structure in which Christians could take
centralized control of their assigned governmental segments, as well as the appointment
powers given to the President (provided that the president himself was not a Syrian
pawn). Using these constitutional powers, a united Christian block could start taking
corrective measures to rid Lebanon of Syrian presence and the presence of Hizbollah and
other such terror groups operating in Lebanon. With the attention garnered by the
assassination of Rafik Hariri,174 and the subsequent attempts on the lives of other antiSyrian voices,175 Lebanese Christians and Muslims began vocal protests which resulted in
at least the superficial withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon.176 The withdrawal,
however, did not remove Syrian influence from Lebanon, and certainly did nothing to
stop terrorist groups from using Lebanon as a training ground and bank through which to
launder ill-gotten funds. Currently, intelligence, military, and security analysts attest to
Lebanon’s role in terrorism,177 and members of both parties on Capitol Hill are adopting
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these views as fact.178 At the same time, a study of legislative proposals and enactments
since September 11, 2001 indicates that the U.S. government is increasingly willing to
provide Lebanon with resources to build peaceful institutions,179 and, especially in the
days after Hariri’s assassination, a bi-partisan chorus was heard essentially
acknowledging that Lebanon is not a willing participant in Syria’s policies and calling for
a stronger and independent Lebanon.180
If the Lebanese Christian communities decided to act as a block, rather than
breaking down along confessional lines, they could elect MPs who would act in concert
(and it is the belief of the author that at least some Sunni members would go along with
this to avenge Hariri). Legal protection of religious beliefs already exists in Lebanese
statutory law,181 and the Christian communities would still be able to maintain their own

Administrator, Bureau for Asia and the Near East, U.S. Agency for International Development); “Lebanon
Reborn? Defining National Priorities and Prospects for Democratic Renewal in the Wake of March 14,
2005,” Panel II of a Hearing of the House International Relations Committee, Federal News Service (Jul.
28, 2005) (statement of Dr. Paul Salem, Writer and Analyst, Beirut, Lebanon); Foreign Assistance
Programs for the Near East, Panel Two of a Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Federal
News Service (Mar. 2, 2005) (statement of David Satterfield, Acting Assistant Secretary).
178
See, e.g., H. Con. Res. 32, 109th Cong. (2005); H. Res. 273, 109th Cong. (2005); 151 CONG. REC. S
4606 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2005) (statement of Sen. Frist); 151 CONG. REC. H. 1331 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005)
(statement of Rep. Engel).
179
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 35 (2005) (advocating, in a report from the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, extending U.S. aide money to southern Lebanon for the purpose of assisting in water
infrastructural development); H. REP. NO. 663 (2002) (advocating, in a report from the House Committee
on appropriations, continued funding of religious and other international organizations working in Lebanon
at or above the $35,000,000 level which had previously been appropriated). Cf. H. REP. NO. 345 (2001)
(advocating extending the bar on sending U.S. funds of any sort to Syria).
180
For an example of pre-Hariri assassination legislation, see Syria Accountability and Lebanese
Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-175 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2004). Some
examples of Hariri assassination-based statements, see Exec. Order 13338 (May 11, 2004) (National
Emergency with Respect to Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting the Exportation and
Reexportation of Certain Goods to Syria) (extended by H. Doc. 21 (May 9, 2005)); H. Res. 91, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. Res. 77, 109th Cong. (2005) . In this context, it is important to note that, in addition to Syrian
removal from Lebanon, Lebanese Christians have voiced an overwhelming interest in settling the
Lebanese-Israeli dispute and bringing peace on that front. See Haddad, supra note 42 (“Lebanese Christian
respondents reveal more than 90% in favor of peace with Israel.”). The stated reasons for this desire for
peace are both aspirational and pragmatic, with many Lebanese seeing peace with Israel as part of the path
towards a more stable and prosperous Lebanese economy. See id. (describing empirical findings regarding
Lebanese Christian support for Lebanese-Israeli peace).
181
See supra Part II.C.

25

personal status-based courts and councils under such an alliance182; the major change
would be a change in mindset from thinking of oneself as a part of a separate legal
enclave within Lebanon to thinking of oneself as a Lebanese Christian. The disconnect
between constitutional, statutory law and tradition could, in this instance, be used to give
the Christian communities the strength and reassurance needed to create a power block.
In turn, the author believes that this block would be formidable enough to encourage
further support from the international community, particularly the U.S., and, provided
that the constitutional and statutory provisions allowing freedom of religion were not
abridged, would pave the way for a stable and less sectarian Lebanon in the future.
Admittedly, there is a risk that the Christian communities could attempt to
overstep legal boundaries. However, considering the negative view taken by the
international community to more strife in the Middle East, and the existence of Muslim
terrorism groups in Lebanon, to say nothing of recent memories of wartime atrocities, it
is unlikely that such a usurpation would happen. Assuming that such a usurpation did not
happen, a Christian block would function to offer Lebanese Muslims the benefit of
having an ideology to adhere to, while not having to splinter their own communities as
much to get to the ideology.
Part III. Syria
A. Christian Communities in Syria
Although they do not share the notoriety of their Lebanese neighbors, Christian
communities in Syria are just as historically based. There are several Christian groups in
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Syria, although most literature lumps them together as “Christians.”183 It is estimated that
10% of Syrians are Christians of some variety.184 The Greek Orthodox Patriarch for
Antioch and All The East sits in Syria, and many religious and charitable works are
carried out through the auspices of the Patriarchate.185 There are several Uniate churches
in Syria, principally Syriac Catholicism,186 the Melkite Church,187 the Assyrian Church of
the East,188 the Copts,189 the Maronites,190 as well as Roman Catholicism itself.191 One of
the often unheard of side effects of the current Iraqi political situation is that the Christian
Assyrians (or ChaldoAssyrians), a group which has in recent years come to rely on the
Kurds for support and protection, are now being removed from their traditional areas by
the Kurds and are fleeing to neighboring countries, including Syria.192
183
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B. Syrian Independence and History
The Syrian Arab Republic was established as an independent entity in 1946,193
and has remained such until the present day, with a slight interruption in independence
occurring during the ill-fated attempt at Egyptian and Syrian unity, the United Arab
Republic.194 Its constitution was not promulgated until 1973.195 The religious
composition of Syria at its founding did not mirror the levels of equality experienced in
Lebanon; the majority of the population was Muslim, with Sunnis being the dominant
sect.196
During the early part of Syria’s existence, there was political instability and
infighting among groups vying for governmental primacy, however political dominance
started to coalesce in the 1960s and 1970s with the creation and rise to prominence of the
Ba’ath party.197 Though widely viewed today through the lens of Saddam Hussein’s
Ba’athist state in Iraq, and the Assad state in Syria, it is interesting to note that one of the
fathers of Ba’athism was himself a Greek Orthodox, who established the party as a way
to promote pan-Arab unity.198 The intent of the Ba’ath party was initially secular, with
the unifying element being a shared Arab ethnicity rather than religion.199
At the same time that Ba’athism was coming to prominence in Syria, so too were
the Muslim minority Alawis, who were easily outnumbered by Sunnis.200 Alawi leaders
began insinuating themselves in the Ba’ath party, as well as governmental and military
193
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apparatuses, and ultimately were able consolidate power and take control of Syria under
Hafiz al-Assad.201 From 1970 until his death in 2000, Hafiz al-Assad ruled Syria under
the guise of being the elected President and Ba’ath party leader.202 In the wake of Hafiz
al-Assad’s death, his second son, Bashir al-Assad, was elected President of Syria in a
move which required a constitutional amendment lowering the age of eligibility for the
office of President.203 Despite his stated desire to bring Syria into the modern world,204
Bashir al-Assad’s presidency has thus far been known for its ties to many terrorist
groups,205 political repression following a brief period of opening,206 and, most recently,
its role in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri – the
increasingly anti-Syrian figure discussed in Part II of this article.207
In terms of Lebanese relations, Syria has considered Lebanon to be a rightful part
of its territory since its founding,208 and has not shied away from saying that its
separation from Lebanon is essentially illegal.209 Indeed, the language of the Syrian
constitution preamble clearly reflects both this belief and the Ba’athist belief that the
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partition of the Middle East was illegal.210 Syrian claims to rights over the domestic
situation in Lebanon only increased with the power of Israel, and often Syria and Israel
have used Lebanon as a battleground in their own disputes.211 The Lebanese civil war
proved a situation ripe for Syrian intervention, and throughout the decades of war the
Syrian regime did just that, although it intervened for different sides at different times,
and was no more averse to providing support to Christian fighters than to Hizbollah
during the course of the conflict.212
The years of ceasefire in Lebanon have not seen a relaxing of Syrian control.213
There is perhaps no better evidence of this than the Hariri incident, which has raised the
specter of Syrian secret police control over Lebanon and its political actors to an
international frenzy.214 No longer the elephant in the room of Middle Eastern diplomacy,
the Hariri assassination, and the public outcry and investigation which followed, has
brought Syrian tactics to the forefront of world politics. In a global atmosphere which
widely regards Syria as implicated in nefarious forms of financing and terrorism, this
controversy has created a weakened position for the current Syrian regime.
C. Syrian Constitutional and Statutory Law
1. Constitutional Law
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The current provisions of the Syrian constitution were enacted in 1973.215 Much
of the constitutional preamble deals with Ba’athist goals and beliefs, enshrining panArabism as the preeminent constitutional and political principle in Syria.216 Theoretically,
Syria is “a democratic, popular, socialist, and sovereign state,”217 to be run as a
republic.218 Further, Islam is declared the primary provider of Syrian legislation,219 and,
although a state religion is not provided for in the constitution, “[t]he religion of the
President of the Republic has to be Islam.”220 At the same time, the constitution also
provides that “[t]he freedom of faith is guaranteed. The state respects all religions,”221
and “[t]he state guarantees the freedom to hold any religious rites, provided they do not
disturb public order.”222 Thus, religious rights are both protected and circumscribed by a
subjective constitutional standard.
Much of the Syrian constitution reflects the strong affiliation which existed
between Syria and communist countries prior to the collapse of the U.S.S.R.223 The role
of socialism in framing the Syrian legal system is particularly evident in the
constitutional provisions regarding categories of allowed ownership,224 and the rights of
owners of real and personal property in their belongings225; the right of the state to
appropriate personal funds and belongings is also set out in the constitution.226
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Interestingly, the Syrian constitution’s plain meaning expresses a respect for the
individual in criminal matters227 and specifically states that “[n]o one may be tortured
physically or mentally or . . . be treated in a humiliating manner.”228 These tenets are
applied more stringently in word than in practice under the Syrian regime according to
official reports.229 Again highlighting the disconnect between constitutional jurisprudence
and practices of the Syrian regime, the constitution guarantees “[e]very citizen . . . the
right to freely and openly express his views in words, in writing, and through all other
means of expression. . . . The state guarantees the freedom of the press, of printing, and
publication in accordance with the law.”230 The right to publicly gather and protest is also
guaranteed in the Syrian constitution, tempered by the express proviso that “[t]he law
regulates the exercise of this right.”231
Electoral districts are defined under Syrian constitutional law as being formed by
a set number of peasants and workers per area, and are not drawn according to sectarian
affiliations.232 Nominally, the People’s Assembly – the Syrian legislative branch – has
wide-ranging constitutional powers,233 however in reality the associates of the Assad
regimes have wielded these powers from within legislative and ministerial circles.234 The
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constitution sets out many powers for the President as well,235 including a place on the
Syrian Supreme Court236 and the High Council of the Judiciary.237
2. Syrian Statutory Law
Constitutional protections aside, all Syrians are entitled to suffrage from age 18
onwards,238 as long as they are not members of the military or police forces,239 or
immigrants to Syria.240 Despite these protections, Syrians lack the ability to directly
change their government at the federal level under the electoral law,241 and have the most
open electoral options at the most basic levels of political elections.242
In terms of personal status, Syrian law recognizes the same set of religious courts
for determining status-based questions as does Lebanese law.243 These courts fit into a
judicial structure in Syria which is heavily linked to the regime at the helm.244
The constitution is essentially ineffective in the face of emergency laws which
have been in effect for decades in Syria245; these rules include the applicability of marital
law to the general population, especially political protesters and dissidents.246
Additionally, the emergency laws are routinely used in Syria to control the media and its
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messages.247 During an attempted reformation of Syria’s laws in 2005, the Assad
government promulgated rules purporting to require that the prosecutorial body involved
in holding prisoners state a reason for the detention within five days of the onset of the
detention248; importantly, however, security and terrorism related crimes do not fall under
the terms of these legal changes.249
None of these laws are directed at religious groups in particular, as the focus of
the state is more the control of the population as a whole – especially given the status of
the ruling Alawi elite as a minority religion within the Syrian Muslim population. The
state apparatus has made itself into an all-encompassing bureaucracy in order to
subjugate the religious and class differences which existed from the time of Syrian
independence onwards, and has at least facially completed part of its task.250
D. Possibilities for the future
The strength of the Christian communities in Syria is difficult to assess because of
the lack of information available, however it is clear that there are such communities
involved in active worship and religious works.251 It is also clear that the forced
migration of Assyrians from Iraq to Syria is an evolving situation252 which, over time,
could result in a political issue for the Syrian regime, as well as Syrian Christian leaders.
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While tensions might not be overtly brewing within Syrian Christian
communities, the increasing international scrutiny on the Assad government could easily
lead to greater disturbances in the social and political order in Syria, which in turn could
cause sectarianism to come to the forefront of Syrian politics, as an issue in Muslim and
Christian communities. Given these considerations, it is important to note that analysts
and U.S. lawmakers have steadily increased their stated beliefs that Syria has been and
continues to be a source of support for terrorist groups,253 their financiers and arms
providers,254 a place of severe political repression,255 and a state involved in repeated
incursions into the sovereignty of Lebanon.256 The Hariri controversy may be the most
visible chapter in this escalation of international hostilities with the Syrian regime,
however the Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003
enacted by Congress and signed into law by the President257 is an indication that
skepticism about the propriety of the Syrian position in Lebanon existed before the death
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of Hariri, and will continue on after the conclusion of the investigation into his
assassination.
In this context, Syrian Christian communities stand in a position to influence not
only their status, but also the future of Syria by taking action to undermine the Assad
regime, at the most extreme, or at least to enforce their constitutional rights and force the
abrogation of emergency and statutory laws which serve only to abridge the rights
guaranteed to all Syrians under the constitution. Certainly, there is risk involved in this
course of action, and perhaps the best way to encourage this type of agitation is through
members of the Syrian diaspora living abroad, as well as funding and legislative actions
by the U.S. and its allies to assist these communities. By creating a shared identity
outside of the state apparatus, Syrian Christians would create a way to circumvent
repressive politics while at the same time acting confidently in their constitutional rights
and privileges. With adequate support, this could prompt regime changes which would
open society for all Syrians and stop Syrian incursions into Lebanon, thus further raising
the international prestige of Syria as a whole and promoting greater regional stability.
In this context, Lebanese and Syrian Christian communities would do best to
work in tandem to promote their agendas within the legal frameworks which protect them
in their respective countries. The current disconnect between the provisions of the
Lebanese and Syrian constitutions and their respective statutory laws is not
insurmountable, especially as constitutions tend to engender a more exalted status in
society than do legislatively promulgated laws, which can be more easily done away
with.
Part IV. Conclusion

36

This article has discussed the Christian communities in Lebanon and Syria, as
well as the legal protections guaranteed for citizens of Lebanon and Syria under their
respective constitutional and statutory laws. Emphasis has been placed on certain aspects
of legal life in both countries, as the author believes that these areas are key testing
grounds for the connection between constitutional protections and everyday life – and in
this test both countries fail. Brief historical sketches have been offered in order to provide
a background for the religious and legal discussions of the article, and also to illustrate
why Christian communities in these countries would function best when they function as
a co-religionist block rather than within the framework of their own sects.
Admittedly, the courses of action advocated in this article would require all
communities to put away sectarian interests, which is much more easily advocated than
achieved in reality. However, the reality of the current political situation in the Middle
East, and international relations as a whole, is changing to the point where alliances with
groups which share at least some communal interests are becoming more necessary than
in the post-World War II era of self-determination and group segregation for statehood
purposes. Both legally and politically, now is the time for Christian communities in
Lebanon and Syria to come together to help reshape their states in ways which previous
conflicts have not allowed. The story of Babel, reflected in modern Christian community
conflicts such as that experienced in Lebanon, is a constant reminder of what happens
when societies divide over a common aim; it is hoped that a bringing together of
Christian communities may take them from the ruin of collapse and failure to a path
towards a state which embraces its enunciated respect for religious freedom.
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